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Abstract Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental general equilibrium model, yet equi-
librium predications and theories of price adjustment for this model remain untested. This
paper reports an experimental test of Edgeworth exchange which demonstrates that prices
and allocations converge sharply to the competitive equilibrium. Price convergence is eval-
uated with the tatonnement model, interpreted as a disequilibrium model of across-period
price adjustment. Subsequently, the extent of within-period adjustment is compared to that
of across-period adjustment. Since most observed price adjustment occurs within trading
periods, price adjustment data is evaluated with two disequilibrium models of within-period
trades. These models are the Geometric Mean model, which is formulated in this paper, and
the Hahn process (Hahn and Negishi [1962]). Price dynamics from experiment sessions ﬁt the
Geometric Mean model better than the Hahn process, and in addition, the Geometric Mean
model provides direction for development of an Edgeworth exchange bargaining model.
KEYWORDS: Competitive equilibrium, disequilibrium dynamics, double auction, Edgeworth
exchange, experimental economics, exchange economy, Hahn process, market dynamics
1 Introduction
Although Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental general equilibrium model, competitive
equilibrium and price dynamic predictions for the model remain untested. The purpose of
Edgeworth exchange experiments is to determine whether the competitive equilibrium of
the model is attained, and if so, to evaluate the convergence process. Experiments support
the competitive equilibrium prediction. Market dynamics are evaluated with three price
adjustment models. Across-period adjustment is evaluated with the tatonnement model,
interpreted as a disequilibrium model. In the tatonnement model, a price is announced by
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the ‘Walrasian auctioneer’ and net demands are reported by agents to the auctioneer, who
then adjusts price to reduce the magnitude of excess demand.1 Exchange in this model
takes place only when an equilibrium price is announced. Tatonnement, interpreted as a
disequilibrium model, is used to evaluate convergence across market replications (or market
‘periods’), with the change in average price between periods t and t+1 equal to a constant
times the excess demand at the average price in period t. Tatonnement though neglects
the substantial price adjustment that occurs within trading periods. In the “Hahn process”
(Hahn and Negishi [1962]), price adjusts in response to excess demand as in tatonnement,
but disequilibrium trades can occur at each announced price, so this model is better suited
to analysis of Edgeworth exchange price data generated with the double auction institution.
The primary limitation of the Hahn process for the evaluation of disequilibrium dynamics is
conceptual: the model relies upon price adjustment in response to excess demand, which is
unobserved by traders in the double auction. In view of these limitations of the tatonnement
model and of the Hahn process, an alternative adjustment model – called the Geometric
Mean model – is formulated in this paper. The Hahn process and the Geometric Mean
model are evaluated by comparing their predicted price paths for each trading period to
the observed within-period price paths from experiment sessions. This paper demonstrates
that the Geometric Mean model provides a better ﬁt than the Hahn process to the price
paths observed in Edgeworth exchange experiments.
In order to develop an experimental test of the competitive equilibrium prediction and
price dynamics of Edgeworth exchange, a utility function over two commodities is induced
(as in Smith [1976, 1982]) for each of six sellers and each of six buyers in an experiment
session. Each agent also has an endowment of one of the two commodities. In order to
facilitate the emergence of stable terms of trade, one of these two commodities is treated
as the numeraire commodity; prices for the non-numeraire commodity are stated in terms
of the numeraire. Buyers initially hold only the numeraire commodity in their endowment,
and sellers initially hold only the non-numeraire commodity in their endowment.2 In each
1 For a description of the tatonnement model and stability results for the model, see Arrow and Hurwicz
[1958] and Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [1959].
2 The position of each subject in the experiment as either a buyer or a seller is of course a ﬁction: those
labelled ‘buyer’ in the experiment because they purchase units of the non-numeraire commodity are also
sellers of the numeraire commodity, and those labelled ‘seller’ purchase the numeraire commodity.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 3
experiment session, the group of six sellers and six buyers engage in a series of either 12 or
15 identical trading periods. In each of these trading periods, the sellers post oﬀer prices
and the buyers post bid prices for the exchange of one unit of the commodity for the number
of units of the numeraire commodity speciﬁed in the oﬀer or bid. Sellers and buyers may
(and typically do) participate in several trades in each trading period.
By the ﬁnal period in four of the ﬁve sessions, allocations and prices were very near
the competitive equilibrium allocation and price: the per capita allocation diﬀered from
the competitive equilibrium allocation by less than 3% and the diﬀerence between the
average price and the equilibrium price was less than 3.1% in each of these four sessions.
In addition to the conﬁrmation of the equilibrium model for Edgeworth exchange, these
experiment sessions provide a unique opportunity to assess price dynamics in Edgeworth
exchange. In the double auction trades are negotiated directly between sellers and buyers,
trades typically occur at a variety of prices even within a single trading period, and most
trades are out of equilibrium. These characteristics of the trading process though, rather
than hindering evaluation of price dynamics, facilitate evaluation of the Hahn process and
the Geometric Mean model of within-period price dynamics.
The Geometric Mean model has two primary elements: price adjustment within each pe-
riod, and price adjustment across periods. The crucial element is within-period adjustment.
In the model, price adjusts in the direction of a weighted geometric mean between the sell-
ers’ and buyers’ marginal rates of substitution at the current allocation. This within-period
price adjustment model has several beneﬁcial characteristics: it is based on the individual
incentives of sellers and buyers rather than on the market aggregate of excess demand, it can
account for and adapt to disequilibrium trades, it converges to a Pareto optimal allocation
in each period, and in many cases it tracks within-period price movements extremely well.
This paper progresses though the steps outlined above. The economic environment uti-
lized in the experiment sessions is described in Section 2. The double auction mechanism is
described for the Edgeworth exchange context in Section 3. Experiment data is evaluated
for across-period convergence in Section 4. Section 5 describes the Hahn process and devel-
ops the Geometric Mean model of within-period price dynamics. Predictions of these two
models are compared to experiment data in Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 4
2 Economic environment
At the beginning of each trading period, each buyer is endowed with 1800 units of the
numeraire commodity (X), which is described to the buyer as currency. Buyers can use
this numeraire to purchase units of the commodity (Y ). Each seller is endowed with eighteen
units of the commodity, which can be sold individually to acquire units of the numeraire
commodity. Following the technique developed by Smith [1976, 1982], utility functions for
each buyer and for each seller are induced with a payment that is determined by evaluation
of a utility function at the ﬁnal allocation of currency (the numeraire commodity X)a n d
the commodity (Y ). Each buyer and each seller has a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) utility function ui(x, y)=ci ((ai xi)ri+(bi yi)ri)1/ri. The parameter ci does not aﬀect
the competitive equilibrium price or allocation, but it does aﬀect the utility level attained
by subject i, and is therefore a useful element of the utility inducement technique, since it
permits the experimenter to rescale a subject’s payoﬀ with a single parameter.
In each period of an experiment session, each of six buyers (agent type A) had the same
utility function uA(xA,y A) and endowment ωA = (1800, 0); each of six sellers (agent type B)
had the same utility function uB(xB,y B) and endowment ωB =( 0 , 18). Table 1 shows the
CES utility function parameters and the endowments of sellers and buyers.
ci ai bi ri ωi
Sellers’ parameters (i =2 , 4,...,12) 0.2560 2.982 109.89 −1 (1800, 0)
Buyers’ parameters (i =1 , 3,...,11) 0.6950 0.362 109.89 −1 (0, 18)
Table 1: Sellers’ and buyers’ parameters.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium price pe is calculated by setting aggregate excess demand in the market
for the commodity (Y ) equal to zero and solving for the equilibrium price. In equilibrium,
the market for the numeraire commodity (X) then clears by Walras’ law. Equilibrium
allocations for buyers and for sellers are determined by substituting the equilibrium price
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for the commodity Y , where ρi =
ri















A (p|ωA) is the excess demand for an individual buyer and Z
Y
B (p|ωB) is the excess
demand for each seller.3 When parameters from table 1 for buyers and sellers are substituted
into equation (1), and the resulting individual excess demand functions are substituted
into equation (2), the equilibrium price pe is obtained by setting aggregate excess demand
equal to zero. Then the equilibrium price pe is substituted into equation (1) to determine
equilibrium allocations. With sellers identical to one another, and buyers identical to each
other, the economic environment can be displayed in an Edgeworth diagram, as in ﬁgure 1.
The equilibrium price for the parameter set used in the experiment sessions is pe
. = 91.
Table 2 shows sellers’ and buyers’ equilibrium allocations and equilibrium utility levels.





















Figure 1: Edgeworth diagrams for experiment sessions.
In order to implement a test of Edgeworth exchange, experiment subjects need to be
provided with both a detailed speciﬁcation of their objectives and of the exchange institu-
tion. The next section describes the double auction institution in the context of Edgeworth
exchange and describes the representation of the utility inducement technique to subjects.
3 Dependence of excess demand on endowments ωA and ωB or on the current allocations (xA,y A)a n d
(xB,y B) is indicated because in the Hahn process, price adjusts after each trade in response to excess
demand at the current allocation. In Section 5.1, which deﬁnes the Hahn process adjustment rule, the
excess demand for Y is written Z
Y
(p|(x, y)) = Z
Y
A(p|(xA,y A)) + Z
Y
B(p|(xB,y B)) on a per capita basis.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 6
Equilibrium Equilibrium
Allocation Utility
Sellers (1163, 7) 189
Buyers ( 637, 11) 189
Table 2: Equilibrium allocations and equilibrium utility levels for sellers and buyers.
3 The double auction
In the double auction mechanism, any seller may submit an ask at any time during a trading
period. An ask, which is the seller’s current report of the fewest units of the numeraire
commodity that he is willing to accept for a unit of the commodity, is entered in the area
labelled “Enter Ask” on the seller’s screen display, as in ﬁgure 2. Similarly, a buyer’s bid,
which represents her current report of the most units of the numeraire commodity that she
is willing to pay for a unit of the commodity, may be submitted at any time. If an ask is
placed that is at or below the current high bid, a trade results with the price equal to the
bid. If a bid is placed that meets or exceeds the current low ask, a trade occurs with the
price equal to the ask. A seller may make any number of asks, and may trade any number of
units that is consistent with his commodity endowment. Similarly, a buyer may make any
number of bids, and may trade any number of units that is consistent with her endowment
of the numeraire commodity. Several speciﬁc rules are implemented in the version of the
double auction used to conduct the experiment sessions reported here. Of these, the most
important is the “spread reduction rule,” which requires that each new ask is made at a
value that is below the current low ask and each new bid is placed at a higher value than
the current high bid. Sellers and buyers have the option to remove any ask or bid that they
have previously made, provided the request to remove the ask or bid is received before it
results in a trade. Each seller is permitted a single ask in the market queue at any time and
any new ask by a seller replaces his previous ask if he has one in the queue. Each ask is
the unit price oﬀered by the seller for a single unit: multiple unit trades are not permitted.
Similar restrictions apply to each buyer’s bids.
During each period, a queue on the seller’s screen displays all current asks and bids
(shown as the “Market Queue” in ﬁgure 2); each buyer’s screen also displays both queues.
When a seller successfully enters an ask into the ask queue, he receives a conﬁrmationMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 7
Figure 2: Seller screen with elements of market institution.
message in the “Messages” area of the screen display. This ask also appears in the “Unit
Ask” row of the “Trade Summary” table, in the column that corresponds to the unit the
seller has oﬀered for sale. Similarly, a buyer receives a conﬁrmation message when she
enters a bid into the bid queue, and also sees an update to the appropriate cell in her Trade
Summary table. When a seller and buyer complete a trade, they both receive a conﬁrmation
message, “Unit Price,” “Unit Proﬁt,” and “Total Proﬁt” ﬁgures are recorded in their Trade
Summary tables, and the price appears in a display of all trade prices from the current
period, shown as the “Market Transaction Prices” graph. The trading phase of each period
lasts 180 seconds. Subjects know the length of the trading phase of each market period,
and a clock at the top of the screen of each seller and each buyer shows the time remaining
in the current phase. Each of these elements of the market institution appears on a seller’s
trading screen, as in ﬁgure 2. Buyers have a similar trading screen.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 8
Proﬁt (or utility) representation
Each market period is separated into three phases. During the preview phase, which
lasts 60 seconds, and during the 180 second trading phase, a seller is able to enter “Price”
and “Quantity” into a “Proﬁt Calculator,” which appears on the lower right hand side of
the seller screen in ﬁgure 2. (The ﬁnal phase is the 30 second review phase, when sellers
and buyers have an opportunity to examine the results of the trading phase.) This Proﬁt
Calculator displays both a tabular and a graphical representation of the utility level that
would result from a proposed trade. Examples of the Proﬁt Calculator are shown for a seller
and for a buyer in ﬁgure 3, starting from the seller’s and the buyer’s initial endowments.
When a subject enters data into the Price and Quantity boxes in this calculator and clicks
“Update Table,” the proﬁt (or utility) level is displayed in the center of the table for the
allocation that would result from the proposed exchange. Proﬁt levels are also displayed
for prices above and below the proposed price, and for quantities above and below the pro-
posed quantity. In addition, the graph represents the “Current Allocation,” the “Proposed
Allocation” which would result from the proposed Price and Quantity, and the “Iso-proﬁt
Curve” (or indiﬀerence curve) that passes through the Proposed Allocation.
Figure 3: Proﬁt calculator table and graph for seller (left) and buyer (right).MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 9
Instructions
These elements of the double auction mechanism and of the representation of proﬁt (or
utility) levels are explained to subjects in a detailed interactive instruction set. Instructions
describe each element of the seller’s (or buyer’s) trading screen independently, and then
describe how elements relate to one another. There are points in the instruction set at
which the seller or buyer is prompted for inputs, and there are eight interactive questions
that must be answered correctly in order to proceed through the instructions. The sequence
of steps through the instructions is outlined in Appendix A.
Experiment sessions and experience
Three experiment sessions were conducted at the University of York in the U.K. on June
7, 2001. The fourth session was conducted at the University of Arizona on November 16,
2001, and the ﬁnal session was conducted in York on December 14, 2001. Subjects in all
Edgeworth exchange sessions had double auction experience in a session with a list of unit
costs for each seller and a list of unit values for each buyer, rather than a utility function.
4C o n v e r g e n c e
This section assesses convergence in the ﬁve experiment sessions. Section 4.1 assesses con-
vergence of per capita allocations to the competitive equilibrium allocation. Final per capita
allocations in each trading period are shown in an Edgeworth diagram for each of the ﬁve
experiment sessions. In Section 4.2, tatonnement is interpreted as a model of across-period
convergence of mean prices, and the adjustment factor from the tatonnement model is esti-
mated for each experiment session. Section 4.3 compares the extent of across-period price
convergence to the extent of within-period price convergence.
4.1 Convergence of allocations across periods
Figure 4 (a) shows the reallocations of units that result from all trades in periods 1, 6,
and 11 of session IU-CES1-DAs-010607a. The series of dots for Period 1 indicate the per
capita allocation of currency and commodity after each trade during the period. The dots
for periods 6 and 11 are interpreted similarly. Figure 4 (b) shows the ﬁnal per capita
allocation for each of 12 periods in the same experiment session. (A more detailed view of
the ﬁnal allocations for this session is shown in Figure 9 (b) on page 25.) Figure 5 showsMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 10
(a) Trades within periods (b) Final allocations across periods













































Figure 4: Trades (left) and ﬁnal allocations (right) in session IU-CES1-DAs-010607a.
ﬁnal allocations by period for each of the other four sessions. There is a signiﬁcant level of
convergence across periods in four of ﬁve sessions, and convergence is almost immediate in
the ﬁrst period of the session shown in ﬁgure 5 (a). Only the session shown in ﬁgure 5 (d)
does not converge to the competitive equilibrium allocation.
In order to examine the rate of convergence of allocations across periods, the distance
of the ﬁnal allocation from the competitive equilibrium allocation is determined for each
period. The metric used to measure the distance between the ﬁnal allocation (xA
t ,y A
t )




















The rationale for this distance metric is straightforward: if trades take place at the equilib-
rium price pe = 91 and trade falls short of or exceeds the equilibrium allocation by α units,
then the distance between the allocation and the equilibrium allocation is α. For example,
if in period t all trades take place at the equilibrium price pe = 91 and one unit per capita is
not traded that should be to reach the equilibrium allocation (xA
e ,y A
e ) = (1163,7) for agent
type A, then (xA
t ,y A
t ) = (1163+91, 7−1). The distance between (xA
t ,y A
t )a n d( xA
e ,y A
e )i n




e )) = 1.




e )) denoted dt, convergence is evaluated with the
regression equation dt = d1 e−r lnt  t. This model can be expressed as the linear model
lndt =l nd1 − r lnt +l n t. (3)MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 11
(a) IU-CES1-DAs-010607b (b) IU-CES1-DAs-010607c
(c) IU-CES1-DAs-011116b (d) IU-CES1-DAs-011214b




















































































Figure 5: Edgeworth diagrams for IU-CES1-DAs sessions.
Figure 6 shows the convergence of the distance between ﬁnal allocations in each pe-
riod and the equilibrium allocation, together with the estimated curve from the model in
equation (3) for session IU-CES1-DAs-010607a. Although a linear model can be ﬁt to this
data, the exponential model in the equation is more appropriate, since distances cannot
be negative. Table 3 summarizes convergence estimates for each of the ﬁve sessions. For
each session, the table includes the estimate   d1 of the initial distance from equilibrium, the
estimate of the rate of convergence   r, the p-value for the hypothesis test that r>0, the R2
statistic for the model, the distance dT between the allocation in the last period and theMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 12
equilibrium allocation that is implied by the estimates   r and   d1 (where dT =   d1 e−  r lnT),
and the number of trading periods T in the session. Strong convergence occurs in four of
the ﬁve sessions (as measured by the estimate   r and its p-value).4,5











Figure 6: Convergence of allocations in session IU-CES1-DAs-010607a.
p-value
Periods   d1   r (  r>0) R2 dT
IU-CES1-DAs-010607a 1-1 2 1.473 0.778 0.000 0.817 0.213
IU-CES1-DAs-010607b 1-1 2 0.238 0.066 0.349 0.016 0.202
2-1 2 0.392 0.348 0.008 0.490 0.170
IU-CES1-DAs-010607c 1-1 2 2.269 0.654 0.006 0.482 0.446
IU-CES1-DAs-011116b 1-1 5 2.424 0.540 0.002 0.489 0.561
IU-CES2-DAs-011214b 1-1 5 0.728 0.009 0.483 0.000 0.710
Table 3: Regression coeﬃcients and statistics from the convergence model.
The regression model in equation (3) can be reformulated to account for subjects’ de-
cision errors. In two sessions, sellers frequently sold units at a loss. The regression model
is reformulated with the additional variable et
 
1 − 2I{¯ pt>pe}
 
, where et is the diﬀerence
4 Fourteen price errors were corrected from the ﬁve sessions for the estimates reported here and in
Section 6. In the ﬁve sessions there were 2932 trades, so the errors represent less than one in 200 trades.
Nine of fourteen errors occurred when a seller omitted a digit in his ask.
5 Two regression estimates are reported in table 3 for session IU-CES1-DAs-010607b. The ﬁrst estimate
is for all 12 periods. The second estimate does not include period 1. The average price in the ﬁrst period of
this session was ¯ p1 =9 3 .44, which is very near the competitive equilibrium price pe = 91. The average price
moved away from the competitive equilibrium price in period 2 to ¯ p2 =9 5 .23. The substantial movement
away from the equilibrium allocation between periods 1 and 2 masks the signiﬁcant restoration toward
equilibrium that occurred over the subsequent 11 periods.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 13
between the number of units purchased at a loss by agent type A and the number of units
sold at a loss by agent type B. The second factor,
 
1 − 2I{¯ pt>pe}
 
, is included to account
for the fact that errors have diﬀerent implications for convergence depending on the side
of the equilibrium price that trades occur on. For example, if agent type B sells units at
a loss, this will depress the price. When the average price is below the equilibrium price,
this slows convergence, whereas if the average price is above the equilibrium, this hastens
convergence. With the decision error term included, the regression equation is







which can be expressed as the linear model
lndt =l nd1 − r lnt + se t
 
1 − 2I{¯ pt>pe}
 
lnt +l n t. (4)
Table 4 shows parameter estimates for equation (4). The second session had no net
decision error in any period, so the estimates reported are from table 3. As noted above,
across period convergence in this session was weak, but this resulted from the price move-
ment away from the equilibrium price between the ﬁrst and second periods. Finally, in the
ﬁfth session, the estimate on the convergence rate r is much more consistent with the other
sessions when decision errors are included in the regression equation: the convergence rate
parameter estimate   r is signiﬁcantly positive at the level p =0 .10.
p-value p-value
Periods   d1   r (  r>0)   s (  s>0) R2
IU-CES1-DAs-010607a 1-1 2 1.347 0.679 0.000 0.194 0.031 0.879
IU-CES1-DAs-010607b 1-1 2 0.238 0.066 0.349 —— —— 0.016
IU-CES1-DAs-010607b 2-1 2 0.392 0.348 0.008 —— —— 0.490
IU-CES1-DAs-010607c 1-1 2 2.037 0.631 0.010 0.100 0.246 0.510
IU-CES1-DAs-011116b 1-1 5 1.391 0.341 0.003 0.082 0.000 0.823
IU-CES1-DAs-011214b 1-1 5 1.045 0.367 0.074 0.078 0.018 0.319
Table 4: Regression summary for convergence model with decision error term.
4.2 Price convergence across periods: tatonnement
Although the tatonnement model does not involve trade out of equilibrium, the model
can be reinterpreted to accommodate disequilibrium trades with repetition of the exchange
environment, as in these Edgeworth exchange experiment sessions. The tatonnement model
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X and Y . The price of the numeraire commodity (X) does not change in the experiment,
but the tatonnement model speciﬁes a theoretical change in the price of X, so the predicted
price for the numeraire commodity is not normalized. The normalization is reestablished
by specifying the (renormalized) predicted price of the non-numeraire commodity Y as the
ratio of the predicted non-normalized prices p Y = p+cZ
Y
(p)a n dp X =1+( 1−c)Z
X
(p).
This adjustment rule depends not only on the excess demand for Y , but also on the
excess demand for X.S i n c e X is the numeraire commodity, the excess demand for X is
















  − ωX
i . (5)













The adjustment rules for the average prices of X and Y between periods t and t+1 are
¯ p X
t+1 =1+( 1− c)Z
X
(¯ pt)a n d¯ p Y
t+1 =¯ pt + cZ
Y
(¯ pt). These two equations can be combined
to obtained a non-linear regression equation with the predicted average price of Y ,¯ pt+1,o n
the left hand side of the equation. Since ¯ pt+1 =¯ p Y
t+1/¯ p X
t+1, the regression equation is
¯ pt+1 =





+  t. (7)
Table 5 shows estimated values of the adjustment rate parameter c from equation (7),
asymptotic standard errors, and 95% conﬁdence intervals for the estimates.6 An estimate of
c at or below one indicates adjustment in the direction predicted by the tatonnement model.
For all values c<¯ c where ¯ c>1, price adjusts in the direction predicted by the tatonnement
6 The regression estimate in table 5 for session IU-CES1-DAs-010607b does not include periods 2 and 3.
The average price in the ﬁrst period of this session was ¯ p1 =9 3 .44, which is very near the competitive
equilibrium price pe = 91. The average price moved away from the competitive equilibrium price in period
2t o¯ p2 =9 5 .23, moved further away in period 3 to ¯ p3 =9 5 .85, and then began to slowly adjust back to the
equilibrium price. Although the average price movements in these two periods were small, they moved in
the opposite direction from the excess demand, which was very small in these two periods. It is remarkable
that price adjusted between periods 4 and 12 toward the competitive equilibrium, since the excess demand
at the mean price in period 3 was Z
Y
(95.85) = −0.799, or −0.133 on a per capita basis. The estimate   c with
periods 2 and 3 included is   c =1 .00012.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 15
model. The threshold value ¯ c is determined by setting ¯ pt+1 =¯ pt in equation (7) and solving
the resulting equation for ¯ c. For ﬁxed values of the CES utility function parameters and
endowments, the equation that determines ¯ c is only a function of ¯ pt. The value of ¯ c listed
for each session in table 5 is the maximum value of c that is consistent with the tatonnement
adjustment prediction for the average price ¯ pt observed in each period of the session. Values
of ¯ c diﬀer by session because the range of observed average period prices diﬀer by session.
In the ﬁrst three sessions, the adjustment prediction of the tatonnement model holds for
every value of c in the 95% conﬁdence interval on the estimate   c. In the fourth session, the
adjustment is in the predicted direction for the estimate   c and for most of the conﬁdence
interval. In the ﬁnal session, adjustment is in the predicted direction at the estimate, but
it is not in the predicted direction for a large part of the conﬁdence interval.
Asymptotic Conﬁdence
Periods   c Standard Error Interval ¯ c
IU-CES1-DAs-010607a 2-1 2 0.99931 0.00008 (0.99912, 0.99949) 1.00013
IU-CES1-DAs-010607b 4-1 2 0.99995 0.00007 (0.99979, 1.00010) 1.00011
IU-CES1-DAs-010607c 2-1 2 0.99952 0.00015 (0.99918, 0.99987) 1.00013
IU-CES1-DAs-011116b 2-1 5 0.99983 0.00042 (0.99941, 1.00024) 1.00011
IU-CES2-DAs-011214b 2-1 5 0.99994 0.00030 (0.99930, 1.00058) 1.00007
Table 5: Regression coeﬃcients and statistics from the tatonnement model.
The regression model in equation (7) can be reformulated to account for subjects’ de-
cision errors, as was done for the convergence estimates in equation (4). The regression
model, reformulated to include the decision error term et
 











1 − 2I{¯ pt>pe}
 
+  t. (8)
No decision error was made in any period of the second session. In each of the other four
sessions, the vector of decision errors was non-zero so the model can be estimated with the
decision error term. Estimates and conﬁdence intervals for the model with the decision
error term are shown in table 6.
In the ﬁrst and third sessions, there were few net decision errors. Consequently, the
estimates   c for these two sessions are similar to the estimates from the regression without
the decision error term. Asymptotic standard errors for the estimates of   d from these two
sessions are large due to the infrequency of decision errors. In the second session, as notedMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 16
Σ
T
t=1|et|   c ASE (  c)C I (   c)   d ASE (  d )C I (   d )
0607a 2 0.9993 0.0001 (0.99916, 0.99950) 0.952 0.658 (-0.536, 2.441)
0607b 0 0.9999 0.0001 (0.99979, 1.00010) —— —— ——
0607c 6 0.9994 0.0002 (0.99900, 0.99980) 1.025 0.792 (-0.766, 2.817)
1116b 40 0.9990 0.0002 (0.99860, 0.99941) 1.254 0.250 (0.709, 1.798)
1214b 29 0.9997 0.0002 (0.99922, 1.00012) 1.797 0.412 (0.899, 2.694)
Table 6: Tatonnement regression model estimates with decision error term.
above, there was no net decision error so the reported estimates are from the model with






were large, and the estimates of   c are lower when the decision error term is included. In
addition, the entire 95% conﬁdence intervals for the estimates   c lie in the set of values of
c that imply convergence under tatonnement for the fourth session and most of the 95%
conﬁdence interval lies in the region that implies convergence in the ﬁfth session.
4.3 Comparison of across-period and within-period price convergence
Table 3 in Section 4.1 demonstrates that allocations converged to the competitive equilib-
rium allocation across trading periods in four of ﬁve sessions. Table 4 in the same section
demonstrates that allocations converged across periods in the ﬁnal session, at the level
p =0 .10, when the decision error term is included in the regression equation. Table 5
in Section 4.2 demonstrates that average prices converged to the competitive equilibrium
price for the price adjustment process predicted by the tatonnement model, in three of ﬁve
sessions. Table 6 demonstrates that average prices converged in the ﬁnal two sessions when
decision errors are included in the regression. This section compares the extent of across-
period price convergence to the extent of within-period price convergence and demonstrates
that across-period price changes are typically smaller than within-period price changes,
which motivates the analysis of within-period price adjustment in Sections 5 and 6.




| ¯ pt − pe|
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. (9)
Denote the number of trades in period t by Kt. Within-period price convergence for periods
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Three cases will help interpret these measures of across-period and within-period con-
vergence. The three cases are ordered from the case with only within-period adjustment,
equal within-period and across-period adjustment, and only across-period adjustment.




k=Kt−4 (pt,k − pe)=α 1
5
  5
k=1 (pt,k − pe),
that is, the average diﬀerence between the last ﬁve prices and the equilibrium price is α
times the average diﬀerence between the ﬁrst ﬁve prices and the equilibrium price, and if
there is no adjustment across periods (so that period t is identical to period t − 1), then
R
a
t =1f o rt =2 , 3,...,T and R
w
t = α for t =1 , 2,...,T.
(2) If price adjusts linearly within each period so that the diﬀerence between the ﬁnal price
in period t and the equilibrium price is α times the diﬀerence between the initial price and
the equilibrium price, and if the ﬁrst price in period t is equal to the last price in period
t − 1, then R
a




(3) If price in each period is constant and the diﬀerence between the price in period t and
the equilibrium price is α times the diﬀerence between the price in period t − 1 and the
equilibrium price, then R
a
t = α and R
w
t =1 .
The average across-period price adjustment R
a
t for all ﬁve sessions was ¯ R
a
=0 .967
and the average within-period adjustment R
w
t was ¯ R
w
=0 .882. Both the across-period and
within-period adjustment factors from periods 8−15 in session IU-CES1-DAs-011214b were
signiﬁcant outliers, due to the fact that prices in that session diverged from the equilibrium
price after period 7. With those periods eliminated, the average across-period adjustment
factor was ¯ R
a
=0 .904 and the average within-period adjustment factor was ¯ R
w
=0 .712.
These measures of observed across-period and within-period adjustment are close to the
ﬁrst benchmark case above: most price adjustment occurs within periods. Since the mag-
nitude of within-period adjustment typically exceeds that of across-period adjustment, it is
likely that across-period adjustment occurs in response to price changes observed within pe-
riods. In this case, the tatonnement model has limited capacity to explain price adjustment.
The next section explores the predictions of two models of within-period price adjustment.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 18
5 Dynamics
In four of the ﬁve experiment sessions, prices converge to the competitive equilibrium price,
and these prices support allocations that are approximately equal to the competitive equi-
librium allocation. In order to assess the mechanics of this convergence, two models of
within-period price dynamics are evaluated. Section 5.1 describes the Hahn process (Hahn
and Negishi [1962]), which adapts the tatonnement model to incorporate disequilibrium
trades. An alternative model of within-period price dynamics – the Geometric Mean (GM)
model – is motivated in Section 5.2 and developed in Section 5.3.
The Geometric Mean model is motivated by a simple observation: for any allocation
outside of the set of Pareto optimal allocations, there is a set of prices that support Pareto
improving trades. Imagine that for the ﬁrst k trades in period t, each price pt,k is the
same until gains from exchange are exhausted at that price for one side of the market.
At this point, the price must adjust in order to achieve a Pareto improving trade. The
Geometric Mean model generalizes the price adjustment rule from this observation. In the
Geometric Mean model, price adjusts after each trade, and the new price is a weighted
geometric mean of the marginal rates of substitution for the representative seller and the
representative buyer. The price adjustment rule for the Geometric Mean model is described
in detail in Section 5.3.
5.1 Hahn process
The Hahn process is conceptually similar to the tatonnement model. In both the taton-
nement model and the Hahn process, price adjusts in response to excess demand. In taton-
nement, a price is announced, agents submit net demands, and the announced price is
adjusted to reduce the magnitude of excess demand. Trade occurs when an equilibrium
price is announced. In the Hahn process, trades take place as soon as a price is announced.
This initial price is held constant during some time interval [0,h ], and subsequently (for
t>h ) price adjusts continually in response to excess demand according to the adjustment
rule ˙ pt = c · Z(pt|(xt,y t)), where (xt,y t) is the allocation that results from all trades that
have occurred along the price path (ps)s∈(0,t). Hahn and Negishi [1962] demonstrate that,
in the continuous-time version of their model, every limit point of this dynamical system is
a competitive equilibrium.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 19
Both the Hahn process and the Geometric Mean model use a price adjustment rule that
depends on the allocation reached after each trade. It is useful to represent per capita allo-
cations of sellers and buyers after k trades in period t in terms of initial endowments and the
vector of trade prices Pt,k =(pt,1,p t,2,...,p t,k). The per capita allocation for buyers can


































In the discrete version of the Hahn process, the price adjustment rule for the numeraire
commodity X after trade k in period t is
p X,H
t,k+1 =1 + ( 1 − c) Z
X 
pt,k





























   
; (11)
the price adjustment rule for the commodity Y is
p Y,H
t,k+1 = pt,k + cZ
Y  
pt,k
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xt,k(Pt,k),y t,k(Pt,k)
   . (13)
Equation (13) characterizes the Hahn process price path during the course of a trading
period, with the free parameter ‘c’.
Hahn process example
For the parameters used in the experiment sessions and for c =0 .995 in the Hahn
process price adjustment rule, discrete-time simulation of the Hahn process price path
approximates the continuous version very closely when the discrete grid is ﬁne. For the
initial price pt,1 = 60, when each trade is for 0.0001 unit (so that it requires approximately
70,000 trades to reach the per capita equilibrium allocation (1163, 7)), the average price in
the period is 90.9229 whereas the equilibrium price is 90.9406. For k ∈{ 1, 2, 3, 4}, if eachMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 20
trade is for 10
−k
unit, pt,1 = 60, and c =0 .995, simulation of the Hahn process produces an
average price ¯ pt that lies in the interval
  





For coarser price adjustments – such as those used in the experiment session in which
each trade is for 1/6 unit on a per capita basis – the discrete version of the Hahn process is
a coarse approximation to the competitive equilibrium, but this is an advantage for model
evaluation, since the discrete version of the Hahn process then predicts a price path that
diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the equilibrium price path. Once a value for c and an initial price
pt,1 for the period are speciﬁed, the price path predicted by the Hahn process is determined.
For example, if the initial price is pt,1 = 60, c =0 .995, and each trade is for 1/6 unit, the
Hahn process prediction for the last trade price of the period is pt,45
. = 85. In the analysis
of experiment data, values of the adjustment rate parameter c are obtained by regressing
observed prices from each period of each experiment session on a weighted average of the
price path predicted by the Hahn process and the ﬁrst trade price for the period, with
the value of c selected to optimize the ﬁt of the regression model, in a sense described in
Section 6.1.
5.2 Geometric Mean model: motivation
Imagine that in trading period t an initial price pt,1 is established, and subsequent prices
pt,k are equal to pt,1 so long as the trade quantity is below the minimum of the quantity
that buyers want to purchase at pt,1 and the quantity the sellers make available at pt,1.A t
this point, either the demand of the buyers or the supply of the sellers is exhausted.
The Edgeworth diagram on the left side of ﬁgure 7 shows k =5 4t r a d e sa tpt,1 =3 7a n d
the allocation (xt,k,y t,k) that results from these trades. For the price pt,1 = 37 shown in
the diagram, the buyers (agent type A) want to purchase over 12 units of the commodity
per capita; the sellers (agent type B) are willing to sell 9 units per capita at pt,1. After k
trades have occurred at the price pt,1 that lead to the per capita allocation (xt,k,y t,k), the
price pt,1 is equal to the marginal rate of substitution for agent type B, so agent type B no
longer oﬀers units for sale at pt,1. In the Hahn process, the excess demand at pt,1, which is
about 3.5 units per capita, leads to an upward price adjustment.
In the Geometric Mean model the new price lies in the cone of prices that support
Pareto improving trades. The Edgeworth diagram on the right side of ﬁgure 7 shows the
situation once the allocation reaches (xt,k,y t,k). Agent type B is no longer willing to sellMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 21












































Figure 7: Trades from the endowment (left) and from the allocation (xt,k,y t,k) (right).
units to agent type A at the price pt,1 = 37, but there is a cone of prices that support
allocations that are Pareto improvements over the allocation (xt,k,y t,k). The original price
pt,1 = 37 is a lower bound on the prices that support Pareto improving trades; the upper
bound ˜ p = 87, which is also shown in the diagram, is determined from the tangency to the
indiﬀerence curve of agent type A at the allocation (xt,k,y t,k). For the example shown in
the Edgeworth diagram, with the original price pt,1 below the equilibrium price, the prices
p ∈ (pt,1, ˜ p) that support Pareto improving trades are above pt,1. If trades occur at a
new price pt,k+1 ∈ (pt,1, ˜ p), then further gains from exchange – beyond those achieved at
the allocation (xt,k,y t,k) – can be realized. In the subsequent period, if the initial price
is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (pt,1,p t,k+1), then price also adjusts
across periods in the direction of the competitive equilibrium price. The Geometric Mean
model generalizes this example by expanding the set of events that trigger a price change
and by specifying the within- and across-period price adjustment rules.
5.3 Geometric Mean (GM) model: formulation
The GM model includes speciﬁcations of both within-period and across-period adjustment.
The key model element, within-period adjustment, is developed in this section and estimated
in Section 6.2. A simple model of across-period adjustment is added to the description of
the GM model, and the resulting model of both within-period and across-period price
adjustment is simulated to demonstrate the path of ﬁnal allocations across periods for theMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 22
GM model. The simulated path of ﬁnal allocations is then compared in the example to the
path of across-period ﬁnal allocations observed in an experiment session.
Within-period adjustment
Price adjustment in the Geometric Mean model is similar to price adjustment in the
motivating example, but in the Geometric Mean model, price adjusts after each exchange.




























As described in Section 5.1, after k trades in period t at prices Pt,k =(pt,1,p t,2,...,p t,k),















sentative buyer. As a function of the observed prices Pt,k, the per capita marginal rate of





















































capita allocation after k trades in period t. The per capita marginal rate of substitution for






















These two marginal rates of substitution deﬁne lower and upper bounds on the prices that
can support Pareto improving trades. Price in the GM model is determined as a weighted
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The weighted geometric mean price after k trades can be written in terms of utility function





























The parameter φ can be interpreted as a proxy for diﬀerences between the bargaining
capability of sellers and buyers. When φ = 0 agent types A and B are treated symmetrically.
The bargaining power of buyers relative to sellers is an increasing function of φ. For example,
if φ = 1 then p G
t,k+1 is equal to the marginal rate of substitution for the sellers, so that all
of the gains from exchange go to the buyers.
Equation (14) completely characterizes within-period GM model price adjustment. The
price adjustment rule depends only on the slopes of the representative seller’s and the
representative buyer’s utility functions at their current per capita allocations, and on the
parameter φ. Trade continues until a Pareto optimal allocation is reached.
(a) Marginal rates of substitution (b) Geometric mean price














































Figure 8: Marginal rates of substitution and geometric mean after 24 trades.
Figure 8 (a) shows the ﬁrst 24 trades in period 8 from session IU-CES1-DAs-010607c,
and in addition, for the representative buyer and the representative seller it shows the
marginal rates of substitution at the per capita allocation that results from these trades.
Figure 8 (b) shows the same information as ﬁgure 8 (a), and in addition, it shows the
weighted geometric mean price p G
8,24(P8,24) after 24 trades. (Trades from period 8 in this
session were selected for graphical representation because, as discussed in Section 6.2 below,MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 24
in this period the Geometric Mean model was closest to the median ﬁt across all 66 periods
from the ﬁve sessions.)
Across-period adjustment
The initial price in period t + 1 is assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution on
the range of prices deﬁned by the ﬁrst price (pt,1) and the last price (pt,Kt) from period t:
pt+1,1 ∼ U
 
[min{pt,1,p t,Kt}, max{pt,1,p t,Kt}]
 
. (15)
If the ﬁrst trade price in period one is determined randomly according to some distribution,
trades within each period are determined by equation (14), and the initial prices in periods
t =2 , 3,...,T are determined by the distributions in (15), then an adjustment process is
completely speciﬁed, both within and across periods.
GM model simulation example
Figure 9 (a) shows all ﬁrst period trades generated by the Geometric Mean model in
equation (14) (with φ = −0.01 starting from an initial price p1,1 = 60). The triangles
connected by the dashed line in ﬁgure 9 (b) show the ﬁnal allocations across periods from
a simulation of this model with the initial condition p1,1 = 60. The dots connected by the
solid line show ﬁnal allocations in each period of session IU-CES1-DAs-010607a, which also
had the initial trade price p1,1 = 60 in period 1. The primary diﬀerence between the series of
ﬁnal allocations from the model and from the experiment session is that in the experiment
sessions, there are frequently ﬁnal allocations that are not Pareto optimal, whereas in the
model, by deﬁnition the ﬁnal allocation is Pareto optimal (relative to the discrete grid of
allocations possible in the experiment). Final allocations generated by the model could
be matched more closely to ﬁnal allocations from each period in the experiment session
by including a positive probability that trades which generate low incremental payoﬀs are
not completed, and trades which lead to small losses are completed. In this way, ﬁnal
allocations on either side of the Pareto set would be observed in the model. Since the focus
of the empirical assessment of the adjustment model is on within-period price adjustment,
this feature has not been added to the model, to keep the model parsimonious.
There is one important caveat with regard to this convergence example that should be
noted. The parameter φ in equation (14) is necessary in this example to obtain convergence
to the competitive equilibrium price and allocation. To illustrate, if ˜ φ = 0 (rather than the
weighted geometric mean with φ = −0.01), then the ﬁxed point for the price adjustment ruleMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 25
(a) Geometric mean model trades (b) End of period allocations




































Figure 9: Within-period trades (left) and across-period ﬁnal allocations (right).
in equation (14), with the across-period adjustments speciﬁed by the distributions in (15),
is p = 85. From the model simulation shown in ﬁgure 9 (b) it is clear that with φ = −0.01 in
equation (14) and the across-period adjustments determined by the distributions in (15), the
average price in the model converges to the equilibrium price pe = 91 and the equilibrium
allocation is reached. The next section demonstrates that, in addition to reaching the
competitive equilibrium of this exchange economy in simulations, the model generally ﬁts
the within-period price data well, and in many cases ﬁts the data remarkably well.
6 Model estimation
Both the Hahn process and the Geometric Mean model are estimated by assuming that
prices follow paths that are weighted averages of the initial price in the trading period
and the path predicted by the Hahn process or the Geometric Mean model. This section
speciﬁes the estimation procedure for both models and compares estimates of the weight
on the price path predicted by each model.
Section 4.1 demonstrates that decision errors signiﬁcantly aﬀect convergence of alloca-
tions in the ﬁnal session. Section 4.2 demonstrates that decision errors signiﬁcantly aﬀect
price convergence across periods in the ﬁnal two sessions. Sixty-nine of seventy-seven de-
cision errors occurred in the ﬁnal two sessions. (See column 1 of table 6.) In the fourthMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 26
session, IU-CES1-DAs-011116b, there were 33 decision errors in the ﬁrst eight periods and
only seven errors in the ﬁnal seven periods. In the ﬁfth session, IU-CES1-DAs-012114b,
there were three decision errors in the ﬁrst eight periods and 26 decision errors in the ﬁnal
seven periods. Fifteen periods from the ﬁnal two sessions include a large fraction (59 of
77) of the decision errors. Given the large number of decision errors in these periods, there
were a number of subjects whose behavior indicates that they had diﬀerent objectives (or
a diﬀerent understanding of the induced objectives) from those in the experimental design.
The analysis in the remainder of this section focuses primarily on the 51 periods in
which the number of decision errors was small. Speciﬁcally, the analysis focuses on periods
1 − 12 of the ﬁrst three sessions, periods 9 − 15 of the fourth session, and periods 1 − 8
of the ﬁfth session. These periods produce much more consistent parameter estimates for
the Hahn process and the Geometric Mean model than the full data set does. Estimates
from the full data set are reported for completeness, but the 51 periods in which the large
majority of trades led to Pareto improving allocations provide a clearer picture of the price
adjustment process in Edgeworth exchange.
6.1 Hahn process estimation
The Hahn process is evaluated by regressing the observed price path Pt,k =( pt,k)
Kt
k=1 in
period t on a weighted average of the initial price pt,1 and the price path P
H
t,k predicted by
the Hahn process. Equation (13) shows that the predicted price p H
t,k+1 depends on the most
recent price pt,k, on the excess demands for X and Y at the current allocation (xt,k,y t,k)
and the most recent price pt,k, and on the adjustment rate parameter c. In the experiment,
the allocation (xt,k,y t,k) after k trades is observed, the price pt,k is observed, and excess
demand is known as a result of the utility inducing technique. The procedure used to select
an adjustment rate parameter c for the estimation of the regression equation is explained
after the regression equation is deﬁned.
For a ﬁxed value of c, a predicted price path is determined starting from the initial price
pt,1. The predicted second price p H
t,2 is determined based on the observed ﬁrst price and the
adjustment rule in equation (13). Subsequent predicted prices are determined iteratively




following equation (13). Denote the observed ﬁrst price and the subsequent predicted





t,k). The price prediction p H
t,k+1 isMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 27
determined from equation (13), with the excess demand evaluated at the allocation predicted
after k trades. With the arbitrary price path Pt,k in equation (13) replaced by the predicted
price path P
H







































    . (16)
Equation (16) is the Hahn process analog of equation (7), which deﬁnes the adjustment rule
for the tatonnement model of across-period adjustment. For k =1 , 2, 3,...,K t − 2, the
regression equation is pt,k+1 = αt p H
t,k+1 +( 1− αt)pt,1 +  t,k+1, which can be expressed as
pt,k+1− pt,1 = αt (p H
t,k+1− pt,1)+ t,k+1. (17)
Estimates of αt from equation (17) depend on the adjustment rate parameter c in
equation (16). An estimate of   αt(c) for period t that is near one with R2 near one would
indicate that the price path over the course of period t is very similar to the path predicted
by the Hahn process, when the initial condition for the predicted Hahn process price path
is the observed ﬁrst price pt,1. The objective of this section is to compare the Hahn process
and the Geometric Mean model. The comparison of the estimates from the two models
that is carried out in the remainder of this section demonstrates that the Geometric Mean
model outperforms the Hahn process model. For this reason, the adjustment parameter c
has been selected to minimize S(  α(c)) ≡ T−1   T
t=1 (  αt(c)−1)2, which is the average squared
distance between the estimates   αt(c) and one, so that the best possible ﬁt for the Hahn
process model can be compared to the ﬁt for the Geometric Mean model. Table 7 shows
the values of c∗ that are obtained when S(  α(c)) is minimized separately for each session.
Session Periods c∗ S(  αt(c∗))
IU-CES1-DAs-010607a 1 - 12 1.000024 0.15972
IU-CES1-DAs-010607b 1 - 12 1.000036 0.45619
IU-CES1-DAs-010607c 1 - 12 1.000013 0.54311
IU-CES1-DAs-011116b 9 - 15 0.999891 0.45706
IU-CES2-DAs-011214b 1 - 8 0.999956 0.19429
Table 7: Adjustment rate c∗ and average squared deviations S(  αt(c∗)).
For the 51 trading periods included in table 7, the value c∗ of the adjustment rate
parameter that minimizes S(  α(c)) = T−1  
T
t=1 (  αt(c) − 1)2, pooled across these ﬁfty-oneMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 28
periods, is c∗ =0 .999982. This value of c∗ has been used to obtain estimates of the
parameters αt(c) in equation (17) for periods 1 − 12 in the ﬁrst three sessions, for periods
9 − 15 from the fourth session, and for periods 1 − 8 from the ﬁfth session. Over these 51
trading periods, S(  αt(c∗)), which is the average squared diﬀerence between the estimates
  αt(c∗) and one, is 0.383. Estimates   α(c∗) for each period in each of the ﬁrst three sessions,
and for periods 2 − 15 in the fourth session are shown in ﬁgure 10.
(a) IU-CES1-DAs-010607a (b) IU-CES1-DAs-010607b
(c) IU-CES1-DAs-010607c (d) IU-CES1-DAs-011116b
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Figure 10: Estimates   αt(c∗)a n dR2 from Hahn process regressions of equation (17).
The values c∗ in table 7 that minimizes S(  α(c)) for each of the ﬁrst four sessions, and the
value c∗ =0 .999982 that minimizes S(  α(c)) pooled across 51 periods are measures of the rate
at which price adjusts from one transaction to the next. The estimates   c of across-period
adjustment rate parameters obtained for the tatonnement model in table 5 of Section 4.2
are all between   c =0 .99931 and   c =0 .99995. These adjustment parameter estimates are all
below the value c∗ =0 .999982 for within-period adjustment. For values of c ∈ (0.996, 1.000)
adjustment is faster for smaller values of c.I fc<0.996, adjustment is faster yet, but theMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 29
price overshoots the equilibrium with the discrete adjustments of the experiment design.
This is the main reason that the estimates of c in Section 4.1 and the values of c∗ in this
section fall in a narrow range near one. Although the estimates   c of across-period adjustment
in the tatonnement model from Section 4.1 are all below c∗ =0 .999982, the within-period
adjustment rate applies to each trade. The total within-period adjustment implied by the
value c∗ =0 .999982 exceeds the adjustment implied by the across-period estimates in table 5
by a large margin. Figure 11 displays the predicted and observed levels of across-period
adjustment and the predicted and observed levels of within-period adjustment for session
IU-CES1-DAs-010607a. For each period in the session, the ﬁgure shows the level of across-
period adjustment predicted by the tatonnement model price adjustment rule as the series
of dots connected by the dashed line. The tatonnement price adjustment rule used is from
equation (7) with the estimated value   c for session IU-CES1-DAs-010607a from table 5.
The graph shows the observed across-period adjustment ratio from equation (9) as the
series of dots connected with a solid line. Within-period adjustment implied by the Hahn
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t,Kt is the predicted ﬁnal price from the Hahn process path from equation (16) and
  αt(c∗) is the estimate on the Hahn path from the regression equation (17). The level of
within-period price adjustment implied by the Hahn process is shown as the series of squares
connected by the dashed line. The level of observed within-period adjustment, as measured
by equation (10) is shown as the series of squares connected with the solid line. The fact that
within-period adjustment exceeds adjustment across periods is apparent from the graph.
This comparison of adjustment parameter estimates from the tatonnement model and the
Hahn process is consistent with the direct comparison of within-period and across-period
adjustment levels in Section 4.3.
Evidence from experiments on the Scarf example of global instability under the taton-
nement dynamic (Scarf [1960]) by Anderson, Granat, Plott, and Shimomura [2003] also
supports the importance of within-period price movements. Anderson et al. examine the
number of price changes that move in the same direction as the prediction of the Hahn
process (which they call the “instantaneous excess demand model”). They ﬁnd that in the
convergent treatment 60.3% of price changes move in the same direction as the instanta-MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 30
Ratios
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Figure 11: Predicted and observed across-period and within-period adjustment.
neous excess demand model or Hahn process. In the Edgeworth experiment sessions, 869 of
1538 or 56.5% of price changes are in the predicted direction. Suppose that price changes
follow the process pk+1 = a + bp k +  k, where  k ∼ N(0,σ 2). Assume without loss of gen-
erality that b>0. For b>0, the observed price movement agrees with the predicted price
movement when pk+1 >p k. The probability of this event is P[pk+1 >p k]=P[ k+1− k >b].
Since  k+1 − k ∼ N(0, 2σ2), price movements in the direction of predicted price movements
will occur 56.5% of the time for b
2σ2 =0 .164, or b =0 .164σ2. The average variance of prices
from the Edgeworth experiments around the predicted Hahn process price paths was 4.22.
If the variance of price around a linear trend is similar, then the value of b that would result
in 56.5% of observed price changes in the direction of predicted price changes is b . =0 .69.
With an average of 43 trades per period, the resulting diﬀerence between the price at the
beginning of a period and the price at the end of a period would be |pKt − p1| =2 9 .75.
Relative to the equilibrium price level of pe = 91, this is a large within-period price change.
In Anderson et al., frequencies of observed price movements that are consistent with the
prediction of the Hahn process are all similar to or greater than the frequency of 56.5% that
was observed in the Edgeworth experiment.
Anderson et al. conclude that across-period price adjustment is more important than
within-period adjustment. They base this conclusion on the fact that the frequency of
within-period price changes that are consistent with the tatonnement adjustment predic-
tions exceeds the frequency of within-period price changes that are consistent with the Hahn
process predictions. Anderson et al. use predictions of both the across-period adjustment
predicted by tatonnement and the within-period adjustment predicted by the Hahn pro-MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 31
cess to assess within-period adjustment. The observed frequencies of within-period price
changes that are consistent with both models can only occur if there is a substantial level
of within-period price adjustment.
6.2 GM model estimation
The Geometric Mean model is tested by regressing observed prices pt,k+1 in period t on a
weighted average of the initial price pt,1in period t and on the prices p G
t,k+1(Pt,k)p r e d i c t e db y
the Geometric Mean model from equation (14). For k =1 , 2, 3,...,K t − 2 the regression
equation is pt,k+1 = αt p G
t,k+1 +( 1− αt)pt,1 + ηt,k+1 which can be expressed as
pt,k+1− pt,1 = αt (p G
t,k+1− pt,1)+ηt,k+1. (19)
Since the initial endowment is on the boundary, the geometric mean price isn’t deﬁned
until after the ﬁrst trade. Then the second price (pt,2) can be predicted as a function of
the geometric mean price after the ﬁrst trade (p G
t,2(Pt,1)) and so forth. Regressions are run
on the data from each period separately. As with the Hahn process model, estimates of αt
near one and R2 near one would constitute strong conﬁrmation of the model.
Regression results are summarized for each period of each of the ﬁrst four sessions in
ﬁgure 12. The dots connected with the solid line show the estimates of   αt for each period.
The dots connected by the dashed line show the R2 statistics from each period for the model
in equation (19).
Since each value of   αt in ﬁgures 12 (a) through (d) is a summary statistic from an entire
period of trading, it is valuable to compare observed price paths to the price paths predicted
by the Geometric Mean model for several representative trading periods. Several important
patterns of the predicted price paths and the observed price paths from the experiment
sessions are depicted in ﬁgure 13. Each graph in ﬁgure 13 shows the observed prices for
one trading period (as a solid line) and the value of the weighted geometric mean price p G
t,k
after each trade during the period (as a dashed line).
The estimate of   αt closest to zero occurred in period 6 of session IU-CES1-DAs-010607c.
The prices from this session are shown in ﬁgure 13 (a) (as the solid line), along with the
price p G
t,k predicted by the GM model after each trade during the period (as the dashed line).
For the period shown in ﬁgure 13 (a), the estimate   αt from equation (19) was 0.009 and
R2 =0 .001. Throughout this period, prices were nearly constant. Clearly from the ﬁgure,
the prices did not follow the Geometric Mean model price prediction, but ﬁgure 12 (c),MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 32
(a) IU-CES1-DAs-010607a (b) IU-CES1-DAs-010607b
(c) IU-CES1-DAs-010607c (d) IU-CES1-DAs-011116b
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Figure 12: Alpha coeﬃcients and R2 from GM model regressions of equation (19).
which shows the estimates of   αt for each period in the session, demonstrates that prices did
begin to follow the Geometric Mean model prediction starting in period 7 and continued to
do so until the end of the session. This pattern – stable prices in early periods followed by
prices that tracked the Geometric Mean model price prediction – also occurred in session
IU-CES1-DAs-011116b. (Compare ﬁgures 12 (c) and (d).)
The median value of   αt across 66 periods in ﬁve sessions was 0.639. The value   αt =0 .633
in period 8 from the third session, IU-CES1-DAs-010607c, was closest to this median value.
The R2 statistic for the model was R2 =0 .523 in this period. Figure 13 (b) shows the trade
prices in that period (as a solid line) and the value of p G
t,k after each trade during the period
(as the dashed line).
The estimate of   αt from all of the 66 trading periods that was closest to one occurred in
period 6 from session IU-CES1-DAs-010607a. In that period,   αt =0 .978 and R2 =0 .774.
Figure 13 (c) shows the trade prices and the value of p G
t,k after each trade during the period.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 33
(a)   αt closest to zero (b)   αt closest to median
(c)   αt closest to one (d)   αt and R2 close to one

































Figure 13: Prices, equilibrium prices, and geometric mean prices from four periods.
Finally, ﬁgure 13 (d) shows the prices and the predicted prices p G
t,k from the Geometric
Mean model for period 11 from session IU-CES1-DAs-011116b. The predicted prices in this
period were close to the actual prices both in terms of the estimated value   αt =0 .951 of
the coeﬃcient on p G
t,k in the regression model from equation (19) and also in terms of the
R2 statistic from the regression equation, which was R2 =0 .872.
The Geometric Mean model ﬁt is superior to that of the Hahn process. The median
value of the estimates   αt across sixty-six periods in the ﬁve sessions for the GM model
was 0.639. For the Hahn process, the median value of   αt(c∗) was 0.448 across all sixty-six
periods. The median value of R2 for the Geometric Mean model was 0.522; for the Hahn
process the median value of R2 was 0.224. Another important measure of the ﬁt for these
models is S(  α)( o rS(  α(c∗)) for the Hahn process). If the average squared deviation between
the parameter estimates   αt and one is small, then price paths from the experiment sessionsMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 34
are predicted well by the model. With the sums taken over the ﬁfty-one periods evaluated
in the previous sections, S(  α)=0 .354 for the Geometric Mean model and S(  α(c∗)) = 0.383
for the Hahn process model. If the sums are taken over all sixty-six periods, S(  α)=0 .509
for the Geometric Mean model, and S(  α(c∗)) = 5.772 for the Hahn process. Although the
average ﬁt of the Geometric Mean model is imperfect, the ﬁt improves dramatically for
the last four periods of the four convergent sessions. In these 16 periods, the mean value
of the coeﬃcient   αt is 0.959, the median value is 0.951, and the mean squared diﬀerence
between the estimates   αt and one is 0.130. Subjects in the experiments had no experience
with markets that involved induced utility. With experience from early periods, strategies
began to respond to diﬀerences in proﬁts for the two sides of the market at disequilibrium
prices, and hence trade prices tracked changing conditions more eﬀectively in later periods.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Geometric Mean model price paths predictions
– which track observed price paths closely in these later periods – reﬂect the price adjustment
process in Edgeworth exchange accurately.
7 Conclusions
Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental model in the neoclassical theory of value. Empirical
assessment of the Axioms of Revealed Preference, as in Cox [1997], demonstrates that
choices over a small number of commodities are consistent with the existence of a regular
preference ordering or utility function. The experiments reported in this paper demonstrate
that when agents with (induced) regular utility functions engage in exchange, the result
is consistent with the Edgeworth model. Consequently, the two key assumptions in the
neoclassical theory of value – that (1) agents have consistent preference orderings, and (2)
exchange by agents with consistent preference orderings (or utility) leads to a competitive
equilibrium allocation – are consistent with experimental evidence, at least when these two
assumptions are evaluated separately.
In addition to conﬁrmation of the static predictions of the Edgeworth model, this paper
addresses important aspects of the dynamics of convergence. Edgeworth exchange exper-
iments exhibit both across-period and within-period convergence. Comparison of price
adjustment across periods and price adjustment within periods demonstrates that most
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price adjustment within trading periods are essential in order to understand the dynam-
ics of convergence in general equilibrium models. Comparison of the Hahn process to the
Geometric Mean model – both of which provide price path predictions within trading pe-
riods – demonstrates that the Geometric Mean model produces a better prediction of the
within-period price adjustment process.
In addition to the superior ﬁt of the Geometric Mean model of price adjustment, the
model links to important local characteristics of sellers and buyers. The price adjustment
rule in the Geometric Mean model is based on marginal rates of substitution of sellers
and buyers. Since prices predicted by the GM model balance the buyers’ and sellers’ local
characteristics, this analysis points in the direction of a model of the interactions among
individual sellers and buyers. One possible direction for development of such models would
be to extend the heuristic bargaining model in Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998] (GD98) and
Gjerstad [2003] from the partial equilibrium case in which sellers have a list of marginal
costs and buyers have a list of marginal values to the case of Edgeworth exchange. Agents’
marginal conditions in the form of values and costs play a prominent role in the model of
double auction bargaining in GD98 and in Gjerstad [2003]. The fact that a price adjustment
model that balances marginal conditions of sellers and buyers also predicts price movements
well in an Edgeworth exchange economy suggests that a model analogous to the model in
GD98 could provide a basis for the price adjustment posited in this paper. In this way,
the observation that price adjustment is predicted well by a simple function of marginal
conditions might form the basis for development of a model of the bargaining process that
underlies general equilibrium. By exploiting the role of marginal conditions in the price
adjustment process that is demonstrated in this paper, it is likely that models will be
developed that demonstrate how competitive equilibrium outcomes are achieved in general
equilibrium models.
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Appendix A
Prior to the start of an experiment session, a seller goes through an instruction set that describes each
of the elements of the seller screen and their operations. These elements include: (1) the seller’s endowment
and current allocation of currency and commodity, (2) the seller’s proﬁt (or utility) function, (3) input that
the seller provides during the session, (4) processing of input (by the double auction mechanism) from the
seller, as well as from other sellers and from buyers, and (5) the determination of the seller’s proﬁt, which
is based on the seller’s allocation of currency and commodity. Buyers’ instructions are analogous to sellers’
instructions. The most important principle adhered to in our implementation of instructions is that inputs
of asks by sellers (or bids by buyers) are initiated by the seller (or by the buyer) in order to avoid creation
of a reference point eﬀect that would inﬂuence asks or bids once the session begins.
Each seller and each buyer views a total of 33 screens, and makes inputs on ﬁve of these screens. There
are eight interactive questions that each seller and each buyer must answer correctly in order to proceed.
Although there are 33 screens, most of the screen space is devoted to the actual screen display that the subject
views and uses during the experiment session. During the instructions, a text box describes elements of the
seller’s screen display. The total length of the sellers’ instructions is 3250 words, which is equivalent to
approximately six pages of text. Subjects typically complete instructions in 15 to 35 minutes.
The sequence of steps through the screens is described below. The instruction summary below refers
frequently to elements of the seller’s screen, which is shown in ﬁgure 2 (p. 7). The instructions for a buyer are
similar. Direct experimenter interaction with subjects was kept to a minimum whenever possible, including
sign-in, seating, and payment.
Screen 1: The subject’s earnings are based on subject’s decisions and the decisions of other participants.
Screen 2: The subject is a seller throughout an experiment session that lasts for 12 trading periods (in the
ﬁrst three of the ﬁve sessions) or 15 periods (in the last two sessions).
Screen 3: The subject should not communicate with or distract others. The subject’s data is anonymous.
Screen 4: P a y m e n ti sm a d ea ta ne x c h a n g er a t eo f£0.01 per unit of experiment currency accumulated.
(This rate was $0.008 in session 4 at the University of Arizona.) Payment is made anonymously in cash
at the conclusion of the experiment session.
Screen 5: There is a set of interactive instructions that follow this screen. The seller will know that he
either has or has not completed instructions based on the status message at the top of his screen.
Screen 6: Each period of the session consists of a 60 second “Preview Phase”, a “Trading Phase” of 180
seconds and a “Review Phase” of 30 seconds. A clock at the top of the screen ticks down to the end of
each phase.
Screen 7: The seller begins each period with eighteen units of the commodity. The current balance of both
currency and commodity are shown throughout each trading period in the Current Allocation box on
the seller’s screen.
Screen 8: The location and purpose of the “Proﬁt Calculator” is described to the seller.
Screen 9: The seller is prompted to enter a Quantity and a Price into the Proﬁt Calculator. The proﬁt
that would result if the seller sold the proposed quantity at the proposed price is shown in the ProﬁtMARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 38
Calculator table, and the Current Allocation and Proposed Allocation are shown in the Proﬁt Calculator
Graph. (See ﬁgure 3 on page 9 for a view of the Proﬁt Calculator for a seller and for a buyer.)
Screen 10: The Proﬁt Calculator table is described to the seller. Rows correspond to diﬀerent prices and
columns correspond to diﬀerent numbers of units sold. The proﬁt level for the price and quantity that
the seller entered on Screen 9 is displayed in the center of the table.
Question 1: For the quantity ‘q’a n dt h ep r i c e‘ p’ that the seller entered, he is asked to state what his
proﬁt would be if he were to sell ‘q + 1’ units at price ‘p’.
Screen 11: The Proﬁt Calculator Graph is described. The graph shows the seller’s Current Allocation, the
seller’s Proposed Allocation (which is the allocation that would result if the seller exchanges q units of
the commodity for pqunits of the numeraire commodity), and the Iso-proﬁt Curve that passes through
the Proposed Allocation.
Screen 12: The seller is reminded that he begins each period with eighteen units of the commodity, and
is asked to use the Proﬁt Calculator to determine what his total proﬁt would be if he were to sell all
eighteen units of the commodity at the price that he entered on Screen 9.
Question 2: The seller is asked to enter the proﬁt that he would obtain if he were to sell all 18 units from
his commodity endowment at the price that he entered on screen 9.
Screen 13: The Proﬁt Calculator includes left and right arrows that can be used to decrease or increase the
quantity proposal and up and down arrows that can be used to decrease or increase the price proposal.
The seller is encouraged to test these features.
Screen 14: An ask is entered in the “Enter Ask” area of the seller screen. The subject enters an ask at
this point.
Screen 15: The ask entered by the subject appears in the Unit Ask row of the Trade Summary display.
Commodity Holding remains unchanged, but Commodity Available is reduced by one unit. The ask also
appears in the “Your Asks” display area.
Screen 16: Asks by all sellers and bids by all buyers appear in the “Market Queue” display.
Screen 17: A new ask is generated randomly to simulate an action by another seller. The new ask is at a
higher amount than the subject’s ask, to illustrate the Ask Improvement rule. (The new ask is generated
randomly from one to ten above the seller’s own ask, though the subject is not informed of the process
that generates the new ask.) The subject is also informed that if he makes a new ask at this point, the
new ask will replace his current ask.
Question 3: The seller has a quiz question appear at this point. The seller, after seeing a description of
the Ask Improvement rule, is prompted to state what is the highest ask that can be submitted at this
point.
Question 4: After the subject answers Question 1 correctly, he is asked to state the number of asks that
will be in the Market Queue if he submits a new ask.
Screen 18: The subject is asked to enter a new ask that improves on the ask submitted by the simulated
seller.
Screen 19: The new ask replaces the seller’s previous ask. The “Messages” display is shown, and updates
to the Trade Summary display are described.MARKET DYNAMICS IN EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE 39
Screen 20: The subject is prompted to remove his ask by double clicking on the ask in the “Your Asks”
display.
Screen 21: Changes to the seller screen that result from the removal of his ask are described, including
updates to the Commodity Available, Your Asks, Market Queue, Trade Summary, and Messages displays.
Screen 22: The seller is prompted to enter a new ask to replace the ask that he just removed.
Screen 23: Updates to the seller’s screen that result from the new ask are reviewed.
Screen 24: A trade occurs when a seller’s ask is at or below the current best bid, or a buyer’s bid meets or
exceeds the best ask. The seller is informed that on the next screen, a bid from a simulated buyer will
be generated that will meet the seller’s ask, so that the seller will trade with the simulated buyer.
Screen 25: Updates to the seller’s Unit Price, Unit Proﬁt, and Total Proﬁt entries in his Trade Summary
table that result from the most recent trade are described. Changes to the Currency Holdings and
Commodity Holdings areas are described. The Market Transaction Prices graph update is described.
Screen 26: The price determination rule is reviewed and the seller is informed that after two questions, a
bid will be simulated that results in a trade with the current low ask.
Question 5: The seller is asked whether a trade will result if a buyer now submits a bid that is below the
current low ask.
Question 6: The subject is asked what the trade price will be if a bid is submitted that meets or exceeds
the current low ask.
Screen 27: A bid is simulated that generates another trade. (This trade is between a simulated seller and
a simulated buyer, so the subject only sees public information regarding the trade, i.e., its price on the
Market Transaction Prices graph.)
Screen 28: A new simulated bid appears in the Market Queue. The price determination rule is reviewed
once more and the subject is asked two more questions.
Question 7: The seller is asked whether a trade will result if he submits an ask that exceeds the current
high bid.
Question 8: The seller is asked what the trade price will be if he submits an ask that is below the current
high bid.
Screen 29: The seller is prompted to enter an ask that is at or below the current high bid, in order to
produce a new trade.
Screen 30: Changes to the Current Allocation, Trade Summary, and other screen displays that result from
the most recent trade are reviewed.
Screen 31: The seller is informed of the Vote to End Period option, and the unanimity rule that triggers
an early end to the trading phase of the current period.
Screen 32: A Period Proﬁt window appears during the review phase of each period.
Screen 33: Subjects are cautioned that the ask by another seller and the bids by other buyers in the
instructions were simulated and that these may not be similar to the responses by buyers and by other
sellers during the experiment. The subject is informed that he has now completed the instructions and
trading will begin when all subjects have completed their instructions.